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Editor’s Notebook
Andrew C. Holman
ore than others, the month of November
is one that western societies for the past
century have filled with rituals of collective
memory. November’s gloomy weather and sometimes
dour mood contributes to this social function, but the
anchor of these reflective practices is Veterans Day, or
Remembrance Day, as it is called in much of the rest
of the English-speaking world. Veterans Day gets its
place in the western calendar because it recognizes
the critical moment when, in 1918, after more than
four years of intractable fighting among European and
American armies, World War I came to its merciful
end: 11-11-11, at the eleventh hour on the eleventh
day of the eleventh month. This year, 2014, marks
the centennial of the onset of that “Great War,” and
expectedly, our commemorative efforts ring louder.
We remember those whose lives were sacrificed to
protect our values and interests, not just in World
War I but in all wars in which our countrymen
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have fought and died before and since.
We remember them in granite and
cement memorials, in cenotaphs and
columns, in bronze statuary, in film, in
songs and sermons, and in poetry, such
as John McCrae’s 1915 “In Flanders
Fields,” which scores of Canadian
schoolchildren of my generation were
made to commit to memory and recite.
We remember, as the oft-repeated
line in Rudyard Kipling’s 1897 poem
Recessional instructs us, “lest we forget.”
But we do forget. As a society, we
forget often and we forget a lot.
November’s collective remembering
prompts us to think about how social
memory really functions and how the
collective acts of remembering and forgetting interact. Collective remembering is a deliberate act, one that is done
as a corrective to forgetting, which we
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assume is a natural, human tendency. If
we don’t make the effort to remember,
the past—our past—and its lessons will
by default be lost and any tutelary
benefit they have for us wasted. But
can it also work in reverse? That is,
can collective forgetting be a deliberate
social act, one designed to counteract
the human tendency to remember?
Some recent scholarship has some interesting things to say on this matter.

For more than a generation, scholars
have examined when and why societies
choose to remember. It is no surprise
that war commemoration is the subject
of most of our collective remembering.
The stories that war commemorations
tell (particularly the ones in which
our side won decisively) are a fertile
site for teaching broad-scoped civic
lessons about the things in which we
are supposed to believe—honor, duty,
character, democracy, justice and the
rule of law. The act of remembering is
the attempt to graft useful meanings
onto otherwise regrettable events and
the chance to prescribe to others how
to behave in the wake of such awful
loss. Paul Fussell’s pathbreaking 1975
book The Great War and Modern Memory
(newly reissued for the centennial by
Oxford University Press) examined the
subject first and best. In Britain (and
elsewhere, as Fussell’s scholarly heirs in
the U.S., France, Russia and Canada
have detailed), World War I bequeathed
an “inherited myth” to a generation of
writers and other symbol makers who
took on the task of remembering the
“truth” about the war and convincing
their compatriots of its meaning. Of
course, societies remember together
things non-martial as well. We remember those great moments of fellow
feeling that are triggered by national
tragedies (such as a president’s assassination or ethical fall, episodes of ethnic
cleansing and acts of mass terrorism)
or triumphs (such as the passage of
landmark civil rights legislation, unexpected Olympic victories and symbolic
athletic feats).

If we don’t make the effort to
remember, the past—our past—
and its lessons will by default be
lost and any tutelary benefit they
have for us wasted.
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that Apartheid caused through a long
and painful national reckoning that its
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) provided, 1996-2000. Japanese
Americans interned during World War
II were issued public apologies and
reparations by the US Government
in 1988, and again in 1992. And most
recently, in Canada, the victims of
that country’s often abusive Indian
Residential Schools have found healing in providing testimony to its own
six-year TRC. These are acts of collective healing that do the opposite of
forgetting: they call attention to these
awful chapters of racist segregation and
systemic violence, and encourage us
to remember.

Cenotaph (Photograph by Duncan Walker)

More recently, scholars have begun to
explore the circumstances that exist
when whole societies willfully disremember past events. Tearing a page
from those scholars who see remembering as a contrived, deliberate act,
some see social forgetting in the same
way: as planned projects that have
intended outcomes. As UCLA scholar
Russell Jacoby’s 1997 Social Amnesia
argues, societies forget on purpose; they
“repress remembrance.” Moreover, just
like collective remembrance, the way
we forget is subject to historical change.
Social amnesia has always affected
human societies and as technological invention has provided more tools
of remembering (i.e. printing press or
the camera), collective forgetting has
become harder to do. Despite this, as
British anthropologist Paul Connerton
argues in a recent book (How Modernity
Forgets, 2009), the conditions of moder
nity (the rise of an increasingly integrated capitalist world market since
the 1850s) make collective forgetting
more socially useful. “Modernity is
conditioned by a particular kind of
forgetfulness,” he writes, and so the
most modern places on earth (Europe
and America) produce “structural
forgetting” more routinely than anywhere else.
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Why do we forget? What do we forget?
The answers to those two questions
are integrally related, if we are to
believe Connerton. Societies can forget
because they are coerced to do so by
authoritarian governments that wish to
whitewash historical black marks—the
memories of Armenian extermination
in the Ottoman Empire, or famine in
the Soviet Ukraine. But forgetting need
not be so dark and repressive. Societies
can choose to forget to achieve positive outcomes—to self-prescribe new,
progressive economic behaviors, to
constitute new collective national
identities, or to counteract competing
versions of a common past (Connerton,
“Some Functions of Collective
Forgetting,” 2010). “The essence of a
nation,” French historian Ernest Renan
wrote famously in his 1882 book, What
is a Nation? “is that the people have
many things in common, but have
also forgotten much together… Every
French citizen must have forgotten the
St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre and
the [Albigensian] massacres in the Midi
in the 13th century.”

In all of this remembering, forgetting
and forgiving, we are making important choices about who we are today.
These three social functions are each,
in their own ways, forward-looking,
prescriptive acts that build community.
When we do them, we are imagining
who we want to be. This month, as
we begin to commemorate the centennial of a long-ago war in moments
of silence, cannon and rif le fire,
parades and prayer, we will do well
to recognize the civic uses of our
November rituals.
Andrew Holman is Professor of History
and Editor of Bridgewater Review.

Of course, collective forgetting is not
collective forgiving. We have developed other rituals and procedures to
serve that function. South Africans
could only come to grips with the harm
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